

08/18/99  
JC572 U.S. PTO

ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. 5437-076/P4101

ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20231

SIR:

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH FOR FILING IS THE PATENT APPLICATION OF

INVENTOR(S) ALAN C. FOLMSBEE

FOR: SECURE PROGRAM EXECUTION DEPENDING ON PREDICTABLE ERROR CORRECTION

ENCLOSED ARE:

- 32 PAGES SPECIFICATION, 26 CLAIMS (6 Pages), 1 SHEET ABSTRACT, 10 SHEETS OF DRAWINGS.
- DECLARATION AND POWER OF ATTORNEY
- AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE INVENTION TO Sun Microsystems, Inc.


THE FILING FEE IS CALCULATED BELOW

CLAIMS	(1) FOR	(2) NUMBER FILED	(3) NUMBER EXTRA	(4) RATE	(5) CALCULATIONS
	TOTAL CLAIMS	26-20 =	6	X \$ 18 =	\$ 108.00
	INDEPENDENT	5- 3 =	2	X \$ 78 =	\$ 156.00
	MULTIPLE DEPENDENT CLAIMS (if applicable)			+ \$260 =	\$ -0-
	LATE FILING OF DECLARATION			+ \$130 =	\$ -0-
				BASIC FEE	\$ 760.00
				TOTAL OF ABOVE CALCULATIONS =	\$ 1,024.00
	Reduction by 50% for filing by Small Entity				\$ .00
	<input type="checkbox"/> FILING IN NON-ENGLISH LANGUAGE			+ \$130 =	\$ .00
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RECORDATION OF ASSIGNMENT			+ \$ 40 =	\$ 40.00
				TOTAL	\$ 1,064.00

- A CHECK IN THE AMOUNT OF \$1,064.00 TO COVER THE FILING FEE IS ENCLOSED.
- PLEASE CHARGE ANY ADDITIONAL FEES FOR THE PAPERS BEING FILED HEREWITH, OR CREDIT ANY OVERPAYMENT, TO DEPOSIT ACCOUNT NO. 50-0448.

111 No. Market Street  
Suite 815  
San Jose, California 95113  
Tel: (408) 293-9934  
Fax: (408) 293-2183

SABATH & TRUONG

  
Stanley N. Protigal  
Attorney of Record  
Reg. No. 28,657  
(408) 293-9934

"Express Mail" mailing number EL334603621US  
Date of Deposit August 18, 1999

I hereby certify that this paper or fee is being deposited with the United States Postal Service "Express Mail Post Office to Addressee" service under 37 CFR 1.10 on the date indicated above and is addressed to the Assistant Commissioner for Patents, Washington, D.C. 20231.

Annette Jacobs  
Name

  
Signature

August 18, 1999  
Date

JC572 U.S. PTO  
08/18/99

**SECURE PROGRAM EXECUTION DEPENDING ON  
PREDICTABLE ERROR CORRECTION**

**INVENTOR:** Alan C. Folmsbee  
a citizen of the United States  
residing at  
3060 Three Springs Court  
Mt. Hamilton, California 95140

**Assignee:** Sun Microsystems, Inc.  
901 San Antonio Road  
MS PALO1-521  
Palo Alto, California 94303

**Entity Status:** Large

SECURE PROGRAM EXECUTION DEPENDING ON  
PREDICTABLE ERROR CORRECTIONCROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

U.S. Patent Application Serial No. \_\_\_\_\_, entitled Microprocessor in Which Logic Changes During Execution, U.S. Patent Application Serial No. \_\_\_\_\_, entitled Execution of Instructions Using Op Code Lengths Longer Than Standard Op Code Lengths to Encode Data, U.S. Patent Application Serial No. \_\_\_\_\_, entitled Secure Program Execution Using Instruction Buffer Interdependencies, U.S. Patent Application Serial No. \_\_\_\_\_, entitled Logic Block Used to Check Instruction Buffer Configuration, U.S. Patent Application Serial No. \_\_\_\_\_, entitled Microprocessor Instruction Result Obfuscation, and U.S. Patent Application Serial No. \_\_\_\_\_, entitled Secure Execution of Program Instructions Provided by Network Interactions with Processor, all invented by Alan C. Folmsbee and commonly assigned, share common subject matter. These applications are incorporated by reference herein in their entirety.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

This invention relates to error correction as applied to a system for providing computer program instructions processed in microprocessors.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Error correction in microprocessor processing of computer software can be used to provide an ability to recover from predicted errors. Normally such predicted errors are the result of noise or other transient phenomenon, and so the errors are not intentionally introduced during normal operation. Further, to protect computer software processed in microprocessors, there is often a need to restrict its use. This may be accomplished by end user agreements, wherein the user agrees to only use the software on one or more agreed upon computers. In other cases, the software can be freely copied, so that piracy restrictions are accomplished either by end user agreement or by simple techniques such as the requirement to use a product serial number to enable use of the software. While this may discourage software piracy and copying, it does not completely prevent a determined software pirate from reproducing the program along with one or more enabling serial numbers or keys.

It is possible to provide more elaborate protective systems for encoding the software, by use of proprietary hardware components for example, or even by requiring the end user to comply with registration requirements in order to enable software operation. In some such arrangements, software instructions from the encrypted program are provided to a central processing unit (CPU) as an instruction set for execution either directly, or as is usually the case, through an operating system. In that respect, the encryption scheme for the program ensures that the program is executable in unencrypted form, at least with respect to the instruction sets provided to the CPU. In other words, the instructions provided to the CPU are in a form that is understandable by the CPU prior to CPU execution. Thus, it is easy for an unauthorized user to determine what is necessary to operate the programs successfully.

It is often desired to provide software and updates of software to end users in such a manner that the software is transferred through public channels, such as the Internet. To provide such software in restricted form, it is desired to provide security to the distributor of the software so that the software is not subject to unauthorized use. In particular, if software is shipped via public or private channels, it is desired that the end user of the software can only use the software on the end user's specified computer, and that the software not be willingly or unwillingly shared by the end user. By computer, it is intended that this includes personal computers, smart cards, work stations, dedicated CPUs embedded in hardware appliances, and any other device in which integrated circuit (IC) microprocessors may be used.

In some programs, the cost of the programs to the end user is such that it becomes economical for third parties to determine what is necessary to circumvent restrictions on use by unauthorized persons. Therefore, it is desired to make the unauthorized duplication or use of a program uneconomical. In order to do that, it is desired to provide an encryption scheme which prevents unauthorized persons from "attacking" the encryption of the software through analysis of the input and output of user commands and instruction sets from the software. It is further desired to provide a software encryption technique in which there are no external indicia of a decryption technique which can be used to analyze the encryption of the software. It is further desired that software be encrypted in such a manner that it is unnecessary to decrypt the software in order to accomplish execution of the software.

## SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

According to the invention, a particularly configurable microprocessor processes computer programs which are selectively operable with that processor. The microprocessor includes an error correcting circuit, a memory store on the microprocessor for storing an error correction key and a programmable feature on the error correcting circuit controlled at least in part by said error correction key. The programmable feature permits selection of an error correction scheme so that intentionally inserted errors are corrected in a predictable manner when a program is provided for execution by the microprocessor.

More particularly according to the invention, a microprocessor includes an error correcting circuit. An error correction key is stored on the processor and the error correcting circuit is programmable at least in part by the key. This permits correction in a predictable manner of intentionally inserted errors in a program, so that a program can be provided for the specific processor.

According to a further aspect of the invention, a CPU with an error correction circuit is provided with an ability to modify its operation with respect to error correction, as a programmable feature. An error correction scheme is selected to be performed by the error correcting circuit. When a program is compiled, the program is modified by the intentional insertion of errors which would result from the execution of the program. By providing error correction schema selected during program compilation, errors can be inserted in the program code, but are handled in a predictable manner by the error correction.

In one embodiment, at least one error correction scheme is selected during program compilation and errors are intentionally introduced into the compiled program. By providing error correction schema selected during program compilation, errors can be inserted in the program code, but are handled in a predictable manner by the error correction.

According to a further aspect of the invention, an error correcting circuit is used for selective execution of computer programs on a particular microprocessor. An error correction key is stored on the microprocessor. The error correcting circuit is programmably controlled at least in part by the key, thus selecting an error correction scheme. Errors are intentionally inserted into the program which are intended to be corrected by the error correcting circuit. The errors are such that correction of the errors

is accomplished in a predictable manner, provided that the error correcting circuit is programmed in accordance with the key.

According to a further aspect of the invention, an error correcting circuit is provided on a microprocessor for purposes of permitting selective operability of the program on a particular processor or group of processors. A programmable feature on the error correcting circuit, provides a selectability in an error correction scheme to be performed by the error correcting circuit. The error correction control information is stored in the form of an error correction key, and this is used to select an error correction scheme for execution by the microprocessor in accordance with the key.

An error correcting circuit on the microprocessor has a programmable feature. An error correction scheme is thereby selected to be performed by the error correcting circuit. The compiled program may have intentionally introduced errors which are predictably corrected by the selected error correction scheme.

In the invention, a microprocessor uses a programmable instruction decoder to decode encrypted instruction op codes. The decoding is accomplished without decrypting the op codes and logic gates immediately process data. The data representation changes change during the execution, which has the effect of securing the program from analysis for decryption.

#### BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Figure 1 is a diagram which illustrates major components of the inventive CPU, in which instructions are compiled for execution by the specific CPU;

Figure 2 is a diagram which illustrates how instructions are routed from the instruction buffer of the microprocessor under control of keyed switch bits;

Figure 3 is a diagram which shows an example of an implementation of the encryption done by the compiler according to the invention;

Figure 4 is a diagram which shows the reverse wire crossing done by the CPU according to one embodiment of the invention;

Figure 5 is a diagram which shows how interdependencies between operations are checked in the instruction buffer;

Figure 6 (prior art) is a diagram which illustrates how memory placement on a typical microcontroller is implemented;

Figure 7 is a diagram which illustrates how memory placement according to the present invention differs from ordinary microcontrollers;

Figure 8 is a diagram which illustrates where the ROM sections may be placed in a microprocessor system according to the invention;

5 Figure 9 is a diagram which illustrates how instruction results are obfuscated;

Figure 10 is a diagram which shows how multiple access flags can be placed within a CPU according to the present invention; and

10 Figure 11 is a flow chart which shows execution of program instructions having intentionally inserted errors.

#### DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

15 Figure 1 is a diagram of a microprocessor system according to the present invention. In the embodiment shown, the microprocessor system includes a CPU 11 fabricated on a single chip. The CPU 11 according to the invention includes reconfigurable logic 13, a programmable instruction decoder 15, fixed data stores such as a serial number block 17, ROM 19, and variable data stores such as a random number generator 21, RAM 23, and E<sup>2</sup>PROMS 31-35. A control circuit 37 and check logic system 39 are also included on the CPU 11. The diagram further shows the flow of encrypted information from a compiler 41, which produces a software program for the inventive CPU 11. It is of course understood that the software content can be transferred indirectly to the microprocessor system, and may involve intermediate program storage as well as other peripheral functions.

20 Software is provided for execution on the CPU 11 in a selected language subject to compilation into standard op-codes. Then these op-codes are encrypted using a key which matches the key used for configuring the inventive CPU 11 during execution. The encrypted OP-codes are combined with camouflage or surplus bits according to one aspect of the present invention and the resulting code string, thus, has its bits permuted according to the key. The resulting bit string is then gathered into long instruction words, such as 128 bit words, and these long words are gathered into multi-word groups that will fit in the instruction buffer of the CPU 11. Some camouflage bits are replaced by interdependency bits that will be dependent on other interdependency bits in other long instruction words. These encrypted long instruction words may then be distributed without further protection to the CPU 11 having the matching key configuration. The

5 encrypted instructions are thus in a form that can only be executed by a microprocessor configured according to the matching key. When the instruction buffer of the CPU 11 is loaded with several long instruction words, interdependencies are checked by logic gates, permutations are reversed, and encrypted op-codes are recovered. Decryption is not  
10 performed to provide standard op-codes, because the instruction decoder on the CPU 11 responds to encrypted op-codes. Some of the camouflage bits are error correcting codes to be used on errors that were intentionally put in the instructions or data.

10. In Figure 1, the CPU 11 is shown including predetermined functional blocks including logic circuitry, represented at 13. In order to allow the CPU 11 to execute programs which are encrypted, the CPU 11 also includes a programmable instruction decoder 15 as well as circuitry to store information specific to that particular CPU 11. This specific information includes serial number information 17, additional identification information in ROM 19, a random number generator 21, and random access memory 23. The logic 13 is structured so as to be reconfigurable according to key bits, ROM bits and externally provided instructions.

15 The CPU 11 is further configured with a distributed plurality of memory stores used for specific decoding information and for increasing the level of security. In one embodiment, these memory stores are provided as E<sup>2</sup>PROMS 31-35. The use of E<sup>2</sup>PROMs permits the information to be rewritten to the CPU 11 but to remain as nonvolatile. The E<sup>2</sup>PROMs 31-35 are used to specify particular configurations of the reconfigurable logic 13 of the CPU 11.

20 According to the invention, once the CPU 11 is configured in a particular way, in order to use the particular configuration, it is necessary to compile program instructions which are modified in order to be executable by the particularly modified CPU 11. This is represented by the depiction of the compiler 41 connected to the CPU 11 by a  
25 communications line 43. If there is a change in the logic and op codes during program execution, these changes are coordinated in order to enable continuous execution.

30 The keys used for encryption and corollary configuration may be chosen at random. Each key is expanded according to one embodiment to a longer set of non-volatile bits that control the microprocessor's logic customization, and may be called "switch bits". Some of the key bits control the instruction decoding and other key bits control hardware memory and logic allocation. These parts of the key may be controlled independently.

## A Microprocessor as a Block Cipher

Figure 2 is a block diagram of the programmable instruction decoder system 15 including an instruction buffer 51 containing multiple registers 53, 55, and 57; and associated multiplexers 63, 65, and 67 which are connected to the multiple registers 53-57. Figure 2 also shows a multiplexer control circuit 69 and a sequencer 71 which is part of the control logic system 37. The registers 53-57 in the instruction buffer 51 are used to store instruction words processed by the CPU 11, and the multiplexers 63-67 receive multiplex control codes from the multiplexer control circuit 69 which in turn receives instruction codes from the sequencer 71 in turn. The sequencer 71 in turn determines a particular sequence that the registers 53-57 deliver their data for further processing, so that it is possible to provide this data from the registers 53-57 in different orders, as determined by the sequencer 71. In addition, the multiplexers 63-67 can be used to control other functions. By way of example, multiplexer 63 is shown controlling a sequencer reset code stored at block 75. Error correcting codes stored at block 77 are controlled by multiplexer 65, which controls error correction operation, as represented at block 79. The error correction circuitry 79 is also supplied with key bits stored at block 81. Op codes received from multiplexers 63-67 are held at register 83, after being processed by the error correction circuitry 79. It is noted, however, that it is also possible to provide information from the different multiplexers 63-65 to different circuits. By way of example, multiplexer 63 provides configuration information to the error correction control circuit 77.

Since the execution of the code, as encrypted, is accomplished by the operation of the microprocessor, no actual decryption algorithm is needed. Therefore, it is possible to operate encrypted instructions in a computer without decryption. This protects encrypted programs from attacks during encryption. This also makes it possible to provide secure software to persons who are not eligible to receive data decryption programs.

Mapping of a "block cipher" according to the present invention to a complicated microprocessor hardware basis enable logic reconfiguration. In the past, block ciphers have operated on abstract information, with the microprocessor that performs the cipher being an exact copy of many other ICs. The invention changes the paradigm from the realm of abstract information into the realm of reconfigurable logic that forms a machine. Instead of manipulating data in complicated ways using concepts that are intended to create bewildering informational complexity, this invention manipulates complicated

hardware using concepts that should present adversaries with an IC that seldom has the same major signals used on the same conductors for different ICs. Each CPU chip produced, according to the present invention, has an instruction set that can be different from the instruction set of any other processor. It is not data that is being descrambled by a standard microprocessor, it is a microprocessor that is configured to execute particularly scrambled code. Complexity theory is used in the logic reconfiguration and in the input and output codings so that the degree of complexity may be compared to the complexities produced by ordinary block ciphers.

10. Program Executed Without Requirement for Decryption

The inventive CPU 11 is not a data decryption device, according to the present invention. The inventive CPU 11 is designed to receive scrambled instructions but not to decrypt them. Instead, it uses scrambled instructions and outputs results from calculations by operating in a mode that accommodates the particular encrypted form of the data. The programs themselves can be written in such a way that data decryption is performed. Optionally, data encryption and decryption software can be written for the inventive CPU 11, as for any other CPU, but that is not the focus of this invention. The "Complexity Theory" which may be applied to an implementation of this invention would provide an analysis of the work complexity magnitude which the scrambling and transformations provide. This work complexity is adjustable by the computer architects who specify the detailed implementation of this invention. It is envisioned that the complexity will be on the order of  $2^{55}$  operations, similar to that of "weak cryptography". That amount of work would enable an adversary to produce instructions which perform the same calculations as the encrypted instructions.

25. Figure 2 illustrates how instructions are used from the instruction buffer under control of keyed switch bits that change the wiring of the logic signals. These signals eventually go to the instruction decoder. The program counter will not be operated by incrementing by one. It will be incremented by m, a number determined by the key, the serial number, the sequencer 71, and the instruction buffer non-instruction contents and instruction contents. Addresses for instructions that are executed in sequence are not sequential addresses, but are arranged by the compiler to be loaded into memory locations which conform to the program counter incrementation plan. For example, if "long instruction words" are 128 bits long, and each instruction has 9 OP-codes, and there are 4

long instruction words in the instruction buffer, then the program counter may increment by amounts from 2 to 18 (modulo 9\*4). The compiler would have provided for this scheme by gathering op-codes into locations planned with this incrementation plan taken into account.

5 The sequencer circuit 71 is included so that more complexity is designed into the instruction execution operations. Some of the key bits are used to initialize the sequencer 71 when it is reset. Then the sequencer 71 produces a new output code on each n clock cycles. This code will be logically combined with encrypted instructions to feed codes to the instruction decoder. The compiler shares sequencer information in common with the  
10 CPU 11 because they share a common key, so the encrypted op-codes are prepared for the logical combinations which the sequencer 71 will provide. This increases the complexity by making each instruction have a varying code that depends on the sequencer 71. For example, the ANDing instruction would have one code the first time it is used, and a different code the second time it is used. The number n, which is the number of clock cycles between new sequencer codes is designed in coordination with the data output block size. If the data output block size is 1 byte, n is 1. If the data output block has 8 bytes, n may be up to 8. The intention is to obscure the relationship between an encrypted op-code and a result so that adversaries cannot simply feed chosen OP-codes and data to the CPU 11 and observe a simple relationship between them. With this plan, the adversary will observe that a block of output data has a complicated relationship with chosen data inputs and chosen long instruction words loaded into the instruction buffer. The CPU 11 will require that the instruction buffer be filled before any data results are output.

Complexity theory is used in the logic reconfiguration. Adversaries who try to  
25 observe the signals on the CPU 11 will encounter more variability than on ordinary ICs. Logic functions will be allocated depending on the key and on the sequencer 71. Each CPU 11 with a different key uses different metal lines and other conductors to use different logic gates for standard functions of a microprocessor.

30 A memory remapping capability will be implemented on the CPU 11 so that memory resources on the CPU 11, which have fixed locations on the silicon chip, will be allocated to be used for different program variables, depending on the key.

### Instructions Longer than Minimum

As an example, each instruction may be 128 bits wide (16 bytes). Also suppose standard op-codes are one byte each. If only 9 encrypted op codes are put in the 16 byte instruction, this leaves 7 bytes for camouflage, error correcting codes, sequencer reset codes, and interdependency codes. A wire crossing will permute the 128 bits when the compiler creates the 128 bit instruction, and the CPU 11 with the right key will reverse this wire crossing before using op-codes for the instruction decoder. The op-codes are well-known in the art of microprocessors and are a form of an abbreviated instruction set. An example of op codes are shown in Appendix 5 (page 316) of Malvino, *Digital Computer Electronics*, second ed., 1983, ISBN 0-07-39901-8.

Figure 3 shows an example of an implementation of the encryption done by the compiler 41 and Figure 4 shows the reverse wire crossing done by the CPU 11. Referring to Figure 3, the compiler 41 receives information from a program source at an input circuit 101 an output encrypted instructions to the CPU at an output circuit 103. The output at 103 is encrypted for the particular CPU 11, as identified by a key provided by the software vendor and a serial number of the CPU, stored on the CPU 11 at 17 (Figure 1). The key and the serial number are expanded at key expansion circuit 111. The key expansion circuit provides information to an op code translator 113, an error production circuit 115, a sequencer scheduler 117 and an instruction buffer model 119. Op codes are provided by software source code from the input 101 and translated into object code at an op code compiler 121. The compiled op code is translated by the op code translator 113 in accordance with the expanded key from the key expansion circuit 111. The translated op codes are then provided to the instruction buffer model 119. The instruction buffer model 119 performs wire crossings of bits to form encrypted instructions.

The error production circuit 115 inserts errors in an instruction set stored in the instruction buffer model. Since the CPU 11 includes an error correction circuit 79, it is possible to use the errors provided by the error production circuit to insert errors which are correctable in a predictable fashion. The error correction circuit 79 is then able to perform error correction in a predictable fashion in accordance with error correction data supplied by error correction code circuit 77. The error production circuit 115 receives its control information from the key expansion circuit 111 and therefore the types of errors produced match those which can be anticipated to be corrected. Moreover, certain

classes of errors can be safely inserted assuming a known error correction algorithm is being used. The successful correction of these errors can be presumed, but only if the known error correction algorithm is used. Therefore, the successful correction of intentionally inserted errors by the error correction circuit 79 can be assured.

5 The instruction buffer therefore provides output instructions which include translated op codes, the errors, the sequence scheduling information from the sequence scheduler 117, and key expansion information. This data is provided to the output circuit for providing encrypted compiled instructions along communication line 43.

10 In Figure 4, long instruction words are used in the instruction buffer 51 of Figure 2 which permit reverse wire crossing by the CPU 11. Each of the multiple instruction registers 53-57 includes more bits than are used to provide the op codes provided at instruction decoder 83. As represented in Figure 4, the locations of bits within these instruction buffers is randomized according to the expanded key. The connections between the individual bits in the multiple buffers 53-57 is therefore random, as represented by the errors in Figure 4. There are, however, no hard wire connections from specific bits in the multiple instruction buffers 53-57 to the instruction decoder 83; instead, the data from the registers 53-57 are provided to the instruction decoder 83 through the multiplexers 63-67 shown in Figure 2.

20 **Instruction Buffer Interdependencies**

Since the blocks of instructions are larger than they need to be, interdependencies between bits of separate instructions can be provided so that the CPU 11 may check these dependencies for conformance to criteria shared by the compiler 41 and the CPU 11.

Figure 5 shows how interdependencies are checked in the instruction buffer.

25 Figure 5 is a block diagram of the instruction buffer 51 and a check logic system 39 according to the invention. The check logic system 39 provides an instruction interdependency check between data provided from the multiple registers 53-57. By combining key bits and serial number bits with selective outputs from the multiple registers 53-57 it is possible to provide a verification of the authenticity of information 30 being transferred through the instruction buffer 51. Different bits stored within the multiple registers 53-57 may include instruction op code bits (represented by I), error correction code instructions (represented by E), sequencer reset codes (represented by S), and validate dependency bits (represented by V). In addition, since there are more bits

within the multiple registers 53-57 than required for transferring operation instructions, it is possible to provide camouflage bits (represented by C), which make it increasingly difficult to resolve the stored bits of information from the shift registers to a decoding algorithm.

5 Fetches from external memory are in blocks of b words, where b is a number between 2 and 32, usually. Not all of the fetched bits are used. This causes confusion for adversaries who try to interpret the behavior of the chip from its pins, without observing internal signals. Some of the bits are there for camouflage so an adversary may waste time analyzing them. Some bits just separate useful bits so that adversaries 10 cannot tell which bits should be combined to compose an op-code. One encrypted op-code may have bits in more than one 128 bit instruction in the instruction buffer.

15 Instruction block sizes are larger than a predetermined minimum size for performing computational functions of the CPU chip 11. Programs compiled to execute on the CPU 11 are compiled in a manner to utilize block allocations of instructions according to a key. Since the blocks of instructions are larger than they need to be, interdependencies between bits of separate instructions can be provided so that the CPU may check these dependencies for conformance to criteria shared by the compiler 41 and the CPU 11.

## 20 Logic Architecture that Comprehends Physical Implementation in a CPU

Referring to Figure 6, a prior art CPU 131 may include specific regions for random access memory (RAM) 133, read only memory (ROM) 135 and a non-volatile memory such as E<sup>2</sup>PROM memory 137. The purpose of the different types of memory 133-137 may be varied, although RAM 133 is typically used for program manipulation, 25 while ROM information 135 is used for fixed data. E<sup>2</sup>PROM is less easily manipulated because of the time it takes to write to E<sup>2</sup>PROM, and is used for program action instructions and other data which is written to the CPU 131 at one time or occasional basis.

30 Referring to Figure 7, each memory type used on the invention (RAM, E<sup>2</sup>PROM, PROM, ROM, anti-fuse, fuse, laser-link) appears in several distributed block sizes in the physical layout, including for example 1 bit memory elements which are used in logic in a static way. According to the invention, there are hundreds of distributed single bit memory blocks used to comprise an entire memory unit. The CPU 141 can include a 16

bit block of memory used to control reconfigurable logic according to the invention and the memory can be in larger n bit arrays, as is normally seen on ICs. This tactic increases the complexity of the work that an adversary must perform. The distribution of memory on a CPU is such that the various forms of memory are widely distributed.

5 Thus, various distributed segments of the CPU 141 are allocated for RAM 143 ROM 145 and E<sup>2</sup>PROM 147. This provides several advantages:

10

1. Multiple applications which use one CPU may have separate memory blocks. This provides more secure separation of information than if only one memory block were to be used to hold information for multiple applications.
2. In order to provide keyed information and instructions which are particular to a specific CPU 141, the instructions are written at multiple locations. Thus, the modified instructions for performing an operation under one particular variant of a program may require instructions changes at various stages within the CPU 141.
3. By locating memory used to reconfigure the CPU 141 at different locations, it becomes more difficult to analyze the CPU to determine which specific codes are provided to the CPU 141.

20

The configuration of the logic architecture is varied according to keys which are used to encrypt the software and to operate the deconvoluting operational logic of the CPU 11 according to the invention. Software compiled according to the keys is implemented so as to accommodate these changes. This allows variations in memory block size and layout, as well as variations in pipeline use. Since each CPU 11 could be provided with a different key, the software compiled according to one key would not work with a CPU varied according to a different key.

25

The keys are preferably programmable in non-volatile memory, such as E<sup>2</sup>PROM (erasable programmable read-only memory) cells on the chip. The IC can hold many keys and they can be erased and re-programmed many times. The chip manufacturer need not know any of the keys on the chip. The user has possession of the chip's security capabilities, and can decide whether to accept or reject conditions established by

software licenses. In other words, the user can purchase a microprocessor chip with all keys in a blank state, and then optionally load keys or not load them.

Normally, the user will never need to load a secret key, but only public keys. The user also has the option of loading secret keys, instead of using the internal key generation procedure, described in the next paragraph. There is no function available to read keys out of the microprocessor chip after they have been stored in non-volatile memory, but an authorized user can erase all of the keys. The trustworthiness of the IC manufacturer is not provable, but it is a goal of this design to include no hardware on the IC that provides a back door for the manufacturer to use. Software can be loaded into the chip to perform secret functions that are not provided by any special hardware, but no software has the power to control all of the hardware.

The keys for the IC and the compiler 41 may be chosen at random and given to the compiler 41 and IC by secure means. However, the following description is one in which the IC creates the keys. The keys are generated by an on-chip random number generator and are kept temporarily in RAM. A public key for a software vendor is entered into the IC and the key is encrypted with that public key. This encrypted key is sent to the software vendor so that a purchased program can be compiled to produce instructions that will only be executable by the IC that created the key. The IC uses the key to produce the custom instruction decoder functions by programming non-volatile memory cells in the instruction decoder. The IC then expands the key into an "expanded key" and stores this expanded key in non-volatile memory cells around the IC. These bits of the expanded key control switching circuits, reconfigure logic, and in general, customize the IC to implement all of the security features described in more detail in the remainder of this text and figures.

The keys will be made partly from unalterable ROM, and partly from PROM which can be programmed. In addition, E<sup>2</sup>PROM memory which can be erased and rewritten can hold some of the key bits. By using more than one memory technology and more than one memory location to hold key bits, it makes it more difficult for an adversary to discover all of the bits of the key.

The inventive arrangement focuses on two levels of vulnerability for ICs: the pins on the IC package and the internal signals on the IC inside the package. According to this aspect of the invention, a microprocessor has its conductors allocated and its logic reconfigured into a scrambled arrangement, depending on a key. It can operate on

ordinary data in ways that are so different from other copies of the IC, so that most  
adversaries are prevented from learning valuable information about the keys, about some  
ROM bits, and about the instructions. Those adversaries who do learn that information  
may often be prevented from profiting by that information by techniques that further vary  
the operation of individual CPUs. Additionally, the data operands and results, which are  
not encrypted, have their usefulness obscured to adversaries. Data encryption can also be  
used as a higher layer of protection.

This aspect of the invention uses a microprocessor that is being scrambled to  
process standard data. The architecture is designed with the physical layout in mind, but  
it does not depend on that level of detail. This architecture brings together the need of  
the end user with the planning of a microprocessor architecture, so that implementors  
have the framework of security upon which they can specify detailed implementations  
which comprehend past security attacks.

#### Instruction Result Obfuscation

It is possible for the CPU 11 to have its logic gates configured to perform variable  
logic instructions. The logic gates may be reconfigured according to a key. Even though  
the instructions may be coded to obscure their meanings, the instructions still specify  
ordinary operations such as AND, OR, ADD and COMPARE. So to make these  
operations more difficult for an adversary to recognize, measures will be taken. The  
logic gates which calculate the result of each basic operation will be variably allocated  
from several possible sets of logic gates. Also, the result of the basic operation will be  
made more obscure than is normally done. The operands that are used as inputs to the  
logic for the basic operations can be in two different formats, so an adversary has a  
difficult time understanding what is going on. This is a tactic called plausible wrong  
answers. In this plan, two correct operands and two plausible wrong operands are sent to  
ADD circuits. Two answers are calculated, a correct answer and a plausible wrong  
answer. These two results are then sent to separate other circuits for further buffering or  
manipulations. This bifurcation, when combined with large data output block size  
introduces some uncertainty into the analysis done by adversaries. Plausible wrong  
answers may be included in data output blocks, but would not be used by external devices  
which are compliant with this scheme.

Referring to Figure 8, there is shown a diagram of CPU 11 comprising various ROM bits 141 including serial number information 143, and reconfigurable logic 145. The ROM bits 141 are distributed about the integrated circuit CPU 11 has the advantage that different controls for the CPU logic can be located at different locations. Thus, if a portion of the logic is reconfigurable, then the actual function of that logic can be more readily controlled by the ROM. In addition, it is possible to mix depletion mode and enhancement mode bits in ROM 141, so that a visual analysis of the CPU 11 does not reduce to a clear analysis of the status of various logic gates and bits.

Figure 9 shows the logical operation of obfuscation of logic executed by the CPU and illustrates how instruction results are obfuscated. By the use of reconfigurable logic gates as described in connection with Figures 1-2, one is able to provide a combination of correct and incorrect answers for each logical operation. Thus, if an operation is defined as using operands A & B, multiple operands can be provided, thus resulting in correct answers, as well as incorrect answers. The purpose of this invention is to make it more difficult for an adversary to gain valuable information by observing signals on ICs. Since instructions are never decrypted into ordinary codes, this is an advancement over earlier chips that have adversaries.

The issue arises about recognizing instructions by the actions taken by the ALU pipeline in response to the nonstandard instructions and data formats. For example, there may be an instruction called AND which takes two operands and calculates the bit wise ANDing result. So someone may expect it to be easy to recognize the instruction by its result. Therefore a technique proposed in this invention is to design logic which is difficult to interpret. In this example, the logic dedicated to the AND function would be configurable into a variety of forms depending on the key, so two different chips would usually have different logic gates allocated to perform the function. Also, a variety of result storage gates would be available to be allocated to hold the result of the ANDing of the operands, and the key would determine which gates are the ones which are used on a particular IC with a particular key.

This variability of logic gate allocation for instruction execution and result storage will make it more difficult for an adversary to understand the operations which take place. False result gates will be allocated to hold wrong results after the instruction is executed to baffle adversaries.

The two data operands can have different data formats (different numerical representations) and the ADD logic gates will take these differences into account to produce a correct answer. Similar techniques for SUB, MULT, etc. (standard instructions) will provide variable allocations of logic gates for different ICs depending on the key. This multiplicity of key-dependent logic implementations for standard logic and arithmetic operations will increase the die size but even more, it will increase the difficulties for adversaries to profit from signal observations.

The CPU 11 is provided in which its logic design is variable, and when a program is provided for use in the particular computer, the program is compiled in accordance with the architecture supplied by the microprocessor. Therefore the microprocessor has a variable instruction set, at least with respect to which functions are generated by which program sequences in object code.

The variability is established by and is supplied to the CPU 11 in memory stores established by E<sup>2</sup>PROM, ROM and RAM memory on the CPU 11. Thus, when a program is provided for use in the particular computer, the program is compiled in accordance with the architecture supplied by the CPU 11 as determined by the key. Therefore, the CPU 11 has a variable instruction set, at least with respect to which functions are generated by which program sequences in object code. The architecture of a particular chip may be established during the logic design of the chip, thereby defining the architecture for each CPU chip independently.

### ROM Implementation

The ROM will hold a serial number, key fragments, customized switch bits, and ordinary microcode. Key fragments are about 8 bits of ROM that are appended to the rest of the key that is stored in programmable memory. Custom switch bits are ROM cells which control inputs to multiplexers and logic gates so that signal routing for logic gate allocation will be partially controlled by these bits. Microcode is commonly used on ordinary microprocessors for general purposes.

Wafer masking techniques usually use "reticles" which can have one or several IC images on each reticle; 4 to 16 ICs per reticle are common. This means that 16 ROM versions can be defined for each silicon wafer. All wafers from a fabrication run will have the same reticles. The 16 ROM versions can have 16 key fragments present, each 8 bits in size. These key fragments would be on the lowest planar level on the physical IC.

The key will not be limited to the lowest layers of the IC structure, as some of the ROM bits should be. Some low level ROM bits will control the allocation of some logic gates. The values of these secret ROM bits are directly mapped to the ROM serial number which is partially made public. So not every chip made according to the invention is the same, even disregarding the keys stored in E<sup>2</sup>PROM cells. If there are 5 16 versions on a wafer, then many wafers will share the same 16 ROM codes. ROM bits may be in arrays or in a single bit configuration so that they are scattered around the die to customize logic in ways that are revealed by the serial number. In this way there appears to be 16 different IC designs due to the reticle design mentioned earlier.

10 Figure 8 illustrates where the ROM sections may be placed on the IC.

Preferably depletion implant ROM processing will be used because this is known to be difficult to observe visually. A depletion device usually is an n-channel MOS transistor that has a negative threshold voltage. The purpose is to use two non-volatile memory technologies to store information which reallocates logic gates to form the CPU. By using depletion ROM as one of those technologies, some signals can remain only on the lowest planar conductor layers of the IC structure. This makes it more difficult for some adversaries to measure the states of the logic.

The invention makes use of reconfigurable logic pervasively. This reallocation of logic gates under control of the key bits and ROM bits is largely what makes this idea valuable. This makes it difficult for adversaries to profit from signal measurements.

#### Serial Number Utilization

Serial numbers are sometimes sent in public view, and keys are normally secret. Each chip will have a unique serial number which is partly stored in ROM and partly 25 stored in E<sup>2</sup>PROM. The serial number is sent to the compiler 41 so that the ROM hardware customization bits will be specified. For example, if 16 ROM versions are produced, as previously described, then there will be 16 ways in which logic hardware will be allocated under control of the ROM codes. The serial numbers stored in ROM will also have 16 values coded in as little as 4 bits. This is one reason for having a serial 30 number.

A second reason for having a serial number is to uniquely identify an IC without using cryptography.

A third way to use a serial number is to encrypt it using a public key and then sending it to the owner of the public key to be interpreted.

Optionally, this invention uses a new technique called the "partial serial number strategy." This strategy is to never show the whole serial number in public, but to only show part of it. The serial number may have 128 bits, for example. Which part of the serial number is shown is under control of some key bits. By using only a part of the serial number, hundreds of partial serial numbers can be derived from only 16 ROM serial numbers, without even using the programmable E<sup>2</sup>PROM sections of the serial numbers. The compiler owner has secured copies of the 16 whole serial numbers so the compiler owner can compare partial serial numbers with sections of whole serial numbers. When a match is found, the compiler owner knows which serial number the partial serial number came from. The serial number is needed for the compiler 41 to produce software which comprehends the state of the IC logic. Some parts of the ROM are not serial numbers but they are secret bits which allocate some logic gates. How these gates are allocated is under control of only the ROM, and these gates should only occupy the lowest layers of the IC structure.

The "partial serial number strategy" is intended to increase the complexity of the task facing adversaries who only observe information that is intentionally sent from a CPU chip. By using only a partial section of the serial number for each IC, hundreds of different CPU chips will send unique serial numbers based on only 16 ROM versions. Other sections of the serial numbers only will come from E<sup>2</sup>PROM cells, and so, they are unique to each IC. One example of how the key may select parts of the ROM serial number is to report the serial number after ignoring the first  $m$  bits of it, where  $m$  is a function of the key. Other ways may skip odd bits in the serial number and report only even bits, where that choice is determined as a function of the key (for example a cryptographic hash of the key).

Adversaries may record and replay serial number fragments which are not valid for their CPU ROM and key combination. If they are sent software, then it is likely that it would not be usable on their CPU chip.

30

#### Networked Interactions

The invention can be programmed to require a handshake with a server to allow continued operation, or it can be put in stand-alone mode. The key can be changed

remotely and new data formats and new software may be needed to continue operating. Physical protection of the key is easier than physical protection of programs, but if a key is discovered by an adversary, networked handshaking can make that captured key useless. Various plans can be created to discover the existence of captured keys, and to deal with pirates in subtle ways, without their knowing they have been detected. While an old key can be programmed into the inventive IC to use an old program with old data, new programs and data formats for new keys will not be useful to pirates with old keys.

Figure 10 is a diagram of CPU 11 showing the use of shows the use of satellite access flags distributed at various physical locations on the CPU 11 according to the invention. By placing various flags at different locations on the CPU, it is possible to provide a control function which is varied in accordance with the specific flag at that point.

#### Satellite Access Flags Made Complicated

Microprocessors and microcontrollers which are designed using the architectural features in this description may be used for satellite TV access electronics, smart cards, personal computers, workstations, and embedded secure appliances for many purposes. Satellite TV access controllers (set-top boxes) may especially benefit from this architecture.

According to the invention, security features have different layers of implementation. One layer allows each of multiple users to have the same security policy features. This permits some a program to be distributed to multiple users without creating customized variations of the programs for individual users. Thus, if, for example, a satellite broadcast were used to service large numbers of customers, that satellite broadcast could include a program which is functional on the computers owned by a large number of customers, without customizing the program for each individual user. A second layer of protection customizes the hardware logic and memory allocation, as described previously, so that commonly distributed programs would be produced in unique ways using common hardware.

Figure 10 is a diagram of CPU 11 showing the use of distributed access flags distributed at various physical locations on the CPU 11 according to the invention. By placing various flags at different distributed locations on the CPU, a control function is varied in accordance with the specific flag used by the control function.

Protection schemes for set-top boxes have a history of being more easily broken than other types of cryptographic circuits. This is because the satellites must broadcast the same cryptographic keys to many set-top boxes simultaneously. Also, for fixed instruction set processors, it is easy to observe how the satellite key is used. The satellite key is stored in known locations on the chip and access approval flags are located in fixed locations. The inventive CPU 11 will reduce these vulnerabilities. The storage for satellite keys would be scattered in many locations on the chip with extra storage available to disguise the satellite key. The location of the satellite key would be different for each key and serial number, so a pirate has a more difficult task to observe a satellite key and to sell the satellite key.

After an authorized set-top box has completed cryptographic calculations to enable reception of the TV programming, an "access flag" may be set to the enabled state. The access approval flag has also been an easy target for pirates: one flag bit can be set with a light beam to give the same access that a cryptographic calculation would have provided. With the keyed allocation of hardware logic and memory which this invention provides, and a large number of flag circuits available, arrangements can be made to use varying flag bit locations of both polarities, ones and zeros. Then, some simple pirate flag setting techniques would become obsolete. Figure 10 shows how multiple access flags may be placed on the IC.

In the case of multiple access flags, the multiple access flags are scattered around the chip in different locations. The access flags are also given different polarities so that some of the bits will be 0's and some of the bits will be 1's to allow access. The precise arrangement of which bits are enabled with 1 and which with a 0 is determined by program instructions, including the variable instructions that are being executed. As a result, each chip is different in the way it is operated. Even though the physical layout of the chip is the same, as a result of the variable keys and access flags, the actual bit states (1's and 0's) being represented at given portions of the chip will be different for each chip when it is in operation.

This scattering of key bits and access flags is useful in preventing adversaries from either understanding or duplicating the results of program code execution. Therefore, even though the software source code itself may be one program, the hardware on the IC which uses this common program would be allocated differently under control of some key bits. To do this, keys are expanded into a set of expanded key bits, as previously

described. Some of these expanded key bits control instruction decoder operations and some do not. For satellite TV applications in which common software is distributed to many inventive ICs, the expanded keys would provide a common instruction decoding logic while providing an uncommon memory and logic allocation. Thus, the key has two

5 separate functions which must be coded into the key when it is produced.

#### Errors Which Are Introduced Intentionally

Encrypting of the software is accomplished, according to one aspect of the present invention, by errors which are intentionally placed in the data and/or into the instructions.

10 The errors are then error-corrected by on-chip circuitry. Since there are a variety of ways to perform error correction, the particular form of error correction is selected at the time of instruction encryption and that particular form of error correction is used to correct the errors on-chip. By way of example, the error correction may be a form of Hamming code. Since there is more than one way to perform this type of error correction, the data or instructions would be essentially useless without providing the information concerning the particular type of Hamming code being used.

15

Referring to Figure 11, a CPU 161 receives error correction information, key information and instructions. The error correction information and key are stored in registers 165, 166 and provided to error correction circuitry 169. The error correction circuitry receives intermediate or final instruction results, represented by block 171 and provides corrected instruction results, represented by block 173. The CPU 161 then is able to process the corrected results and provide a desired output.

These codes can come in many varieties, and they can be key-dependent. The long instruction words may contain modifications to the error correcting codes so that data can have varying error types and correction types.

25

#### Instructions versus Data

Data and instructions are two different categories of information and this invention is designed to use encrypted instructions regardless of the data format. It is emphasized that instruction encryption is the primary purpose of this invention, a second purpose is to scramble on-chip logic, memory, and signal allocations, and that data is either unprotected, or given some small protection which does not involve data encryption.

This invention is not about data that is being scrambled by a standard microprocessor, it is about a microprocessor that is being scrambled to process standard data.

On the chip, there will be RAM for data and RAM for instructions. Some of the bits in those memories will be there to obfuscate the code, thereby confusing attackers.

5 For example, if two numbers are added, the two operands can have extra bits that are not used. The result of addition in the arithmetic logical unit (ALU) can have extra bits of erroneous information that are stored into the data RAM. This randomizes results within the processor so the attacker may not be able to deduce whether addition occurred, or if the operation was subtraction, or EX-OR or other possibilities. In addition, the data memory mapping would become different for different chips.

10 There is an option to use a standard instruction set for an ordinary computer language with non-standard data representations. This provides an ability to perform mixed operation, in which standard op-codes are combined with variable data representations. Therefore there are four ways to operate: first, with standard instructions and standard data formats; second, with encrypted instructions and standard data formats; third, with standard instructions and non-standard data numeric representations; and fourth, with encrypted instructions and non-standard data numeric representations.

20 **Dynamically Varying Data Representation**

According to a further aspect of the invention, dynamically varying representation is used for data processed in a CPU. The dynamically varying representation is still usable in arithmetic and logical operations without being decrypted. There are many ways to represent numbers, and the inventive CPU hardware design will have apparatus 25 to operate on these multifarious representations, in coordination with the compiler 41. The compiler 41 creates a schedule for varying the numeric data representations, and the chip follows this schedule to use the data correctly. Examples of the proposed numeric representations are:

30 1. Data represented in Residue Number Systems can use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to provide calculations which some adversaries will find difficult to understand. For example, a number can be broken down into three parts under

three secret moduli. The key would hold information on the three moduli, without which, the number cannot be easily re-assembled.

## 2. Radix conversions

5

## 3. Redundant Number Systems

When results are written to external memory, they are written in blocks of w bytes, where w is from 1 to 32 usually. Not all of the results in this block are correct or useful results. Some results are correct results for a wrong operation to give an adversary the appearance of a behavior which is not the behavior which is used in the program. This will increase the difficulty of the task of an adversary who seeks to understand relationships between instructions, operands, and results. For example, if two input data operands are added, the data output block can contain both the sum and the difference so an adversary may not know what instruction was used to produce the answer. The key would determine the location of the correct answer. The destination for the output data block would need to have some coordination to determine which parts of the output data block are correct.

20

## Pipelined Architectural Implementation

Some microprocessors use pipelining of the arithmetic logical unit (ALU) to obtain better performance. In this example, which uses a pipeline with 6 stages, it will be demonstrated how to implement some of the features of this invention into a pipelined architecture.

25 Each stage of the pipeline will contribute to the techniques which make the inventive CPU useful. The 6 stages are labelled: fetch, decode, register, execute, cache, writeback. Also, the Instruction Cache has a line size of 128 bits, which is the same as the instruction size of the preferred embodiment.

In the Fetch stage of the pipeline, the instruction buffer holds four entries and the compiler 41 can use this buffer arrangement to provide interdependencies between 30 instructions in groups of four to increase the complexity for any attacks that may be attempted. Bits of instructions in the instruction buffer are set to cross-check each other

in a manner similar to parity checking. At this stage of the pipeline, hardware can check different bits in several instructions to verify the validity.

The Decode Stage of the pipeline usually allows instruction folding, but this can be changed to allow instruction buffer dependency checking, to compose error correcting codes from the key and instructions, and to re-arrange bit substrings in the wide instructions to make decoding more efficient and to display camouflaging behaviour to any unauthorized observers. Errors in the instructions will be corrected at this stage. In addition, it is possible to include camouflaged bits in the instructions. The camouflaged bits may then either be stripped, or checked by separate circuitry in order to determine the existence of the camouflaged bits.

The Register stage of the pipeline will be involved with using the variable numeric representations. Type checking of data will be important to using the correct arithmetic operations on the operands involved. This stage will also perform error correction on data.

The Execute stage of the pipeline may involve Object Field manipulation. Object Fields can have data that is scrambled before they are presented to the CPU chip. During the Execute stage, data can be unscrambled before being operated upon arithmetically. This makes the data less usable outside of the setting of the inventive CPU.

The Cache stage of the pipeline writes audit information to a security cache which is not normally visible to unauthorized users. Also, there is one extra register that is visible to users, and which can have various uses, such as a watchdog timer, which the program is required to write during the cache stage. At the security cache, any discrepancies which may have occurred earlier are noted, an audit may be performed, and flag bits set. At this point, it is not necessary to notify the user because the user may or may not be an authorized user of the software.

The Writeback stage of the pipeline may initiate a server handshake. At that point, information regarding security flags may be transmitted back to the server.

In the inventive CPU, instruction op codes are provided in such a pipeline architecture, and an information key is established. The information key provides instruction security commands in the multiple steps of the pipeline architecture, and an arithmetic logic unit (ALU, part of the logic 13 shown in Figure 1) provides variability of logic circuitry for program execution. The execution can be performed using encrypted op codes or using standard op codes that provide standard instruction operation types.

## Compiler Interactions

The compiler 41 will be designed to comprehend all aspects of the CPU 11 implementation of the architecture described for this invention. The key that is shared with the compiler 41 and the CPU 11 determines operating characteristics of the program counter, sequencer, wire crossings for the instruction buffer, interdependencies in the instruction buffer, error correcting plans, data representations, instruction encryption, output block size, memory allocation, secure memory partitioning, and all other details needed to use functions on the CPU 11.

There is more than one way to implement the invention, so more than one compiler type may be needed. In particular, the key can have two section: one for controlling instruction encryption and execution, and another for controlling unrelated hardware reconfigurability. In other words, the compiler 41 must be able to use a key so that a single encrypted instruction stream is available to many ICs which have different physical memory allocations, different result obfuscation circuit allocations, and various other reconfigurable logic resources which do not interfere with the execution of a common encrypted instruction program used on many ICs. Then the invention would be able to thwart power analysis techniques that seek to discover the key. Each time a smart card cryptographic key is used in a transaction, logic could be re-allocated so that power use would change.

## Key Management

Key distribution could be handled securely by a variety of means. In a preferred embodiment, each chip has a public serial number. A second number, the key, could be provided by a Random Number Generator (RNG) on the CPU 11. The RNG may use the principles described in U.S. Patent 4,694,412 "Random Number Generator for Use in an Authenticated Read-Only Memory", to Alan Folmsbee. This RNG uses several oscillators with capacitive feedback from the random number to alter their frequencies. This RNG also has small local heaters that turn on and off at irregular intervals to provide unique thermal histories for each session of key generation. Thermal noise and radioactive decay also provide randomness. A key is generated by this RNG and it is stored in non-volatile memory. The RNG may also create more serial number bits to be stored in programmable memory. In this way a user can customize the serial number, for added flexibility.

The public key of the software company is loaded into the microprocessor chip as used in this invention. The key is encrypted with that public key. The encrypted key and the serial number are sent to the software company. The software company decrypts the encrypted key with its private key and examines it to determine if it has acceptable 5 statistical properties. If it passes those tests, the software company uses that key to encrypt the purchased software with the algorithm that the invention requires. The software company sends the encrypted software to the customer. That software will only be executable on one microprocessor chip; that is, the one that generated the random key.

The CPU 11 can have a large number of keys stored in E<sup>2</sup>PROM cells so that 10 software may be executed. The software may therefore execute instructions from many sources using different keys. Each key is comprised of multiple bits which alter the instruction decoders, obfuscation circuits, and the arithmetic logic unit (ALU). The software is not decrypted before execution, but selected software bits will be routed by "keyed wiring" to supply the correct instruction, data, and address bits to the correct circuit blocks.

There would be a facility for the software to alter its own key under certain 15 circumstances. For example, the software license may require monthly payments to be made. If the payments are not made, the software can alter the internal key. To accomplish this, a permission code may be required to be downloaded from the Internet before the program is run a predetermined number of times. The chip sends an audit 20 code to the software company and then the permission code is sent from the software company which is a customized number for each microprocessor chip for one program. The intent is that the customized number permits the software to be used by one user. The chip may give warnings about impending key modification, so the user has plenty of 25 time to get the permission code. While the program is running, a real-time-clock emulation program can keep clock time so that it can tell when a time period has expired since the program was started. That is in addition to the limit of times the program can run without a new permission code. A clock frequency detection circuit can detect whether the clock is stopped or slowed too much.

Another circumstance may cause the software to erase its own key; that is if the 30 chip is being tampered with. The microprocessor chip as used in this invention can have light detectors or e-beam detectors that set off the alarm. It could detect the presence of probe capacitances, broken metal lines, and irregularities in bond-pad inductances. A

silent alarm might cause a prompt to appear, for the user to send another code to the software manufacturer in the manner used for monthly billing audits. In essence, it is a silent alarm. The software company can then respond with something other than the usual permission code.

5 Key bits and access flags may be placed in certain locations on a semiconductor die. A memory array of E<sup>2</sup>PROM cells are used to hold the key bit. Numerous small arrays of E<sup>2</sup>PROM cells are scattered around the chip at different locations. These bits are then used to store keys which will be on different physical locations on the die. Since the key bits are not always the same, each processor would be different. This means that 10 the processor uses a variable instruction set, and different hardware on each individual chip will be activated upon execution of the instructions. If address mapping is scrambled in a variable way, each chip executing this same logarithm will be activated in a different way as a result of the hardware on the chip being activated in a different way. Protecting a key is easier than protecting larger information sets.

15 There are two common situations which deserve some explanation:

1. The chip is in an embedded environment in which all instructions are under one key, such as a smart card or set-top box for satellite TV. A tiny Card Operating System in this case would be coded for the key and would be held on the chip.
2. The chip is in an open system such as a PC or workstation where an Operating 20 System (OS) is not using a key.

25 The first situation is the easiest to deal with. This will be where the CPU 11 is dedicated to one embedded situation where it uses one key for a long time. It can have its key changed by re-programming E<sup>2</sup>PROM cells. Then it uses the new key for a long time.

30 The second situation can use a null key (all zeros) where the OS uses ordinary op-codes for its work, and then the secret key bits are used for the variable instruction set for non-OS tasks. On-chip memory is partitioned so there is a section which the OS cannot access because it is only used for programs running under the key. When implemented for this scenario, the E<sup>2</sup>PROM cells holding the key bits are implemented as Non-Volatile RAM cells (NVRAM) where a default key bit is stored in the E<sup>2</sup>PROM cell

section of the NVRAM cell, and a variable key bit may be written into the RAM section of the NVRAM cell. This RAM section may be all zeros, so it uses standard op-codes such as Java byte codes, or it can be a volatile key so that the chip will use non-standard instructions from a coded OS.

5 There can be two programs interleaved (or more than two if the added expense of IC real estate is provided to allow several keys to be ready for use at any time). One program can use the default key in the NVRAM cells and then, with little delay, the key bit value in the RAM part of the NVRAM cells can become the controlling key bits.

10 When one key is in effect, the logic gates are allocated to form a microprocessor under that key's command. When another key is put in effect, the instruction decoder is re-programmed to respond to the other instruction set. For this purpose, where switching instruction sets occurs frequently, the instruction decoder should be controlled by volatile RAM cells so that the endurance is not limited by E<sup>2</sup>PROM cell endurance.

15 One configuration which may be useful in that scenario is the null-key configuration, with which standard op-codes are used for standard OS or other purposes. No security is lost when switching to a null-key because the on-chip memory is partitioned to prevent the OS from reading memory locations that are provided exclusively for the secret key. The coded software under the key is not usable by the OS, so that does not need to be protected. Off chip memory is not protected, and the program must be written to recognize this fact.

20 When the switch is made from one key to another key, the state of the processor is saved to secure on chip memory locations so that the state can be restored when the first key again comes into effect.

25 The CPU 11 uses the programmable instruction decoder to decode encrypted instruction op codes. The decoding is accomplished without decrypting the op codes and logic gates immediately process data. The data representation changes during the execution, which has the effect of securing the program from analysis for decryption.

30 A custom instruction set is provided for each CPU chip 11 or groups of CPU chips. That custom instruction set would be used by the software manufacturer to send a unique version of a mass produced program to a customer with a microprocessor chip. The CPU is therefore programmed for that custom instruction set. The length of each instruction, and the other features of this invention should be configured to have cryptographically significant security when viewed from the IC pins. Pirates who

examine signals inside the IC will be deterred from success by the encryption techniques. A secret key is used by the IC and by the compiler 41 so that the instructions produced by the compiler 41 are only executable by an IC which has the same key. The key is stored on the IC in non-volatile memory and it controls the instruction decoder, 5 reconfigurable logic, signal routing, error corrections to instructions, a sequencer circuit, and instruction buffer content interdependency checking. The key also determines the program counter operations which would not be incremented in the usual manner. The key also controls instruction result obfuscation circuits so that common microprocessor results, such as the ANDing of two operands, are not easily recognized. The key 10 controls memory mapping in the IC so that physically fixed memory resources are allocated in different ways for ICs with different keys.

20  
25  
30  
35  
40  
45  
50  
55  
60  
65  
70  
75  
80  
85  
90  
95  
100  
105  
110  
115  
120  
125  
130  
135  
140  
145  
150  
155  
160  
165  
170  
175  
180  
185  
190  
195  
200  
205  
210  
215  
220  
225  
230  
235  
240  
245  
250  
255  
260  
265  
270  
275  
280  
285  
290  
295  
300  
305  
310  
315  
320  
325  
330  
335  
340  
345  
350  
355  
360  
365  
370  
375  
380  
385  
390  
395  
400  
405  
410  
415  
420  
425  
430  
435  
440  
445  
450  
455  
460  
465  
470  
475  
480  
485  
490  
495  
500  
505  
510  
515  
520  
525  
530  
535  
540  
545  
550  
555  
560  
565  
570  
575  
580  
585  
590  
595  
600  
605  
610  
615  
620  
625  
630  
635  
640  
645  
650  
655  
660  
665  
670  
675  
680  
685  
690  
695  
700  
705  
710  
715  
720  
725  
730  
735  
740  
745  
750  
755  
760  
765  
770  
775  
780  
785  
790  
795  
800  
805  
810  
815  
820  
825  
830  
835  
840  
845  
850  
855  
860  
865  
870  
875  
880  
885  
890  
895  
900  
905  
910  
915  
920  
925  
930  
935  
940  
945  
950  
955  
960  
965  
970  
975  
980  
985  
990  
995  
1000  
1005  
1010  
1015  
1020  
1025  
1030  
1035  
1040  
1045  
1050  
1055  
1060  
1065  
1070  
1075  
1080  
1085  
1090  
1095  
1100  
1105  
1110  
1115  
1120  
1125  
1130  
1135  
1140  
1145  
1150  
1155  
1160  
1165  
1170  
1175  
1180  
1185  
1190  
1195  
1200  
1205  
1210  
1215  
1220  
1225  
1230  
1235  
1240  
1245  
1250  
1255  
1260  
1265  
1270  
1275  
1280  
1285  
1290  
1295  
1300  
1305  
1310  
1315  
1320  
1325  
1330  
1335  
1340  
1345  
1350  
1355  
1360  
1365  
1370  
1375  
1380  
1385  
1390  
1395  
1400  
1405  
1410  
1415  
1420  
1425  
1430  
1435  
1440  
1445  
1450  
1455  
1460  
1465  
1470  
1475  
1480  
1485  
1490  
1495  
1500  
1505  
1510  
1515  
1520  
1525  
1530  
1535  
1540  
1545  
1550  
1555  
1560  
1565  
1570  
1575  
1580  
1585  
1590  
1595  
1600  
1605  
1610  
1615  
1620  
1625  
1630  
1635  
1640  
1645  
1650  
1655  
1660  
1665  
1670  
1675  
1680  
1685  
1690  
1695  
1700  
1705  
1710  
1715  
1720  
1725  
1730  
1735  
1740  
1745  
1750  
1755  
1760  
1765  
1770  
1775  
1780  
1785  
1790  
1795  
1800  
1805  
1810  
1815  
1820  
1825  
1830  
1835  
1840  
1845  
1850  
1855  
1860  
1865  
1870  
1875  
1880  
1885  
1890  
1895  
1900  
1905  
1910  
1915  
1920  
1925  
1930  
1935  
1940  
1945  
1950  
1955  
1960  
1965  
1970  
1975  
1980  
1985  
1990  
1995  
2000  
2005  
2010  
2015  
2020  
2025  
2030  
2035  
2040  
2045  
2050  
2055  
2060  
2065  
2070  
2075  
2080  
2085  
2090  
2095  
2100  
2105  
2110  
2115  
2120  
2125  
2130  
2135  
2140  
2145  
2150  
2155  
2160  
2165  
2170  
2175  
2180  
2185  
2190  
2195  
2200  
2205  
2210  
2215  
2220  
2225  
2230  
2235  
2240  
2245  
2250  
2255  
2260  
2265  
2270  
2275  
2280  
2285  
2290  
2295  
2300  
2305  
2310  
2315  
2320  
2325  
2330  
2335  
2340  
2345  
2350  
2355  
2360  
2365  
2370  
2375  
2380  
2385  
2390  
2395  
2400  
2405  
2410  
2415  
2420  
2425  
2430  
2435  
2440  
2445  
2450  
2455  
2460  
2465  
2470  
2475  
2480  
2485  
2490  
2495  
2500  
2505  
2510  
2515  
2520  
2525  
2530  
2535  
2540  
2545  
2550  
2555  
2560  
2565  
2570  
2575  
2580  
2585  
2590  
2595  
2600  
2605  
2610  
2615  
2620  
2625  
2630  
2635  
2640  
2645  
2650  
2655  
2660  
2665  
2670  
2675  
2680  
2685  
2690  
2695  
2700  
2705  
2710  
2715  
2720  
2725  
2730  
2735  
2740  
2745  
2750  
2755  
2760  
2765  
2770  
2775  
2780  
2785  
2790  
2795  
2800  
2805  
2810  
2815  
2820  
2825  
2830  
2835  
2840  
2845  
2850  
2855  
2860  
2865  
2870  
2875  
2880  
2885  
2890  
2895  
2900  
2905  
2910  
2915  
2920  
2925  
2930  
2935  
2940  
2945  
2950  
2955  
2960  
2965  
2970  
2975  
2980  
2985  
2990  
2995  
3000  
3005  
3010  
3015  
3020  
3025  
3030  
3035  
3040  
3045  
3050  
3055  
3060  
3065  
3070  
3075  
3080  
3085  
3090  
3095  
3100  
3105  
3110  
3115  
3120  
3125  
3130  
3135  
3140  
3145  
3150  
3155  
3160  
3165  
3170  
3175  
3180  
3185  
3190  
3195  
3200  
3205  
3210  
3215  
3220  
3225  
3230  
3235  
3240  
3245  
3250  
3255  
3260  
3265  
3270  
3275  
3280  
3285  
3290  
3295  
3300  
3305  
3310  
3315  
3320  
3325  
3330  
3335  
3340  
3345  
3350  
3355  
3360  
3365  
3370  
3375  
3380  
3385  
3390  
3395  
3400  
3405  
3410  
3415  
3420  
3425  
3430  
3435  
3440  
3445  
3450  
3455  
3460  
3465  
3470  
3475  
3480  
3485  
3490  
3495  
3500  
3505  
3510  
3515  
3520  
3525  
3530  
3535  
3540  
3545  
3550  
3555  
3560  
3565  
3570  
3575  
3580  
3585  
3590  
3595  
3600  
3605  
3610  
3615  
3620  
3625  
3630  
3635  
3640  
3645  
3650  
3655  
3660  
3665  
3670  
3675  
3680  
3685  
3690  
3695  
3700  
3705  
3710  
3715  
3720  
3725  
3730  
3735  
3740  
3745  
3750  
3755  
3760  
3765  
3770  
3775  
3780  
3785  
3790  
3795  
3800  
3805  
3810  
3815  
3820  
3825  
3830  
3835  
3840  
3845  
3850  
3855  
3860  
3865  
3870  
3875  
3880  
3885  
3890  
3895  
3900  
3905  
3910  
3915  
3920  
3925  
3930  
3935  
3940  
3945  
3950  
3955  
3960  
3965  
3970  
3975  
3980  
3985  
3990  
3995  
4000  
4005  
4010  
4015  
4020  
4025  
4030  
4035  
4040  
4045  
4050  
4055  
4060  
4065  
4070  
4075  
4080  
4085  
4090  
4095  
4100  
4105  
4110  
4115  
4120  
4125  
4130  
4135  
4140  
4145  
4150  
4155  
4160  
4165  
4170  
4175  
4180  
4185  
4190  
4195  
4200  
4205  
4210  
4215  
4220  
4225  
4230  
4235  
4240  
4245  
4250  
4255  
4260  
4265  
4270  
4275  
4280  
4285  
4290  
4295  
4300  
4305  
4310  
4315  
4320  
4325  
4330  
4335  
4340  
4345  
4350  
4355  
4360  
4365  
4370  
4375  
4380  
4385  
4390  
4395  
4400  
4405  
4410  
4415  
4420  
4425  
4430  
4435  
4440  
4445  
4450  
4455  
4460  
4465  
4470  
4475  
4480  
4485  
4490  
4495  
4500  
4505  
4510  
4515  
4520  
4525  
4530  
4535  
4540  
4545  
4550  
4555  
4560  
4565  
4570  
4575  
4580  
4585  
4590  
4595  
4600  
4605  
4610  
4615  
4620  
4625  
4630  
4635  
4640  
4645  
4650  
4655  
4660  
4665  
4670  
4675  
4680  
4685  
4690  
4695  
4700  
4705  
4710  
4715  
4720  
4725  
4730  
4735  
4740  
4745  
4750  
4755  
4760  
4765  
4770  
4775  
4780  
4785  
4790  
4795  
4800  
4805  
4810  
4815  
4820  
4825  
4830  
4835  
4840  
4845  
4850  
4855  
4860  
4865  
4870  
4875  
4880  
4885  
4890  
4895  
4900  
4905  
4910  
4915  
4920  
4925  
4930  
4935  
4940  
4945  
4950  
4955  
4960  
4965  
4970  
4975  
4980  
4985  
4990  
4995  
5000  
5005  
5010  
5015  
5020  
5025  
5030  
5035  
5040  
5045  
5050  
5055  
5060  
5065  
5070  
5075  
5080  
5085  
5090  
5095  
5100  
5105  
5110  
5115  
5120  
5125  
5130  
5135  
5140  
5145  
5150  
5155  
5160  
5165  
5170  
5175  
5180  
5185  
5190  
5195  
5200  
5205  
5210  
5215  
5220  
5225  
5230  
5235  
5240  
5245  
5250  
5255  
5260  
5265  
5270  
5275  
5280  
5285  
5290  
5295  
5300  
5305  
5310  
5315  
5320  
5325  
5330  
5335  
5340  
5345  
5350  
5355  
5360  
5365  
5370  
5375  
5380  
5385  
5390  
5395  
5400  
5405  
5410  
5415  
5420  
5425  
5430  
5435  
5440  
5445  
5450  
5455  
5460  
5465  
5470  
5475  
5480  
5485  
5490  
5495  
5500  
5505  
5510  
5515  
5520  
5525  
5530  
5535  
5540  
5545  
5550  
5555  
5560  
5565  
5570  
5575  
5580  
5585  
5590  
5595  
5600  
5605  
5610  
5615  
5620  
5625  
5630  
5635  
5640  
5645  
5650  
5655  
5660  
5665  
5670  
5675  
5680  
5685  
5690  
5695  
5700  
5705  
5710  
5715  
5720  
5725  
5730  
5735  
5740  
5745  
5750  
5755  
5760  
5765  
5770  
5775  
5780  
5785  
5790  
5795  
5800  
5805  
5810  
5815  
5820  
5825  
5830  
5835  
5840  
5845  
5850  
5855  
5860  
5865  
5870  
5875  
5880  
5885  
5890  
5895  
5900  
5905  
5910  
5915  
5920  
5925  
5930  
5935  
5940  
5945  
5950  
5955  
5960  
5965  
5970  
5975  
5980  
5985  
5990  
5995  
6000  
6005  
6010  
6015  
6020  
6025  
6030  
6035  
6040  
6045  
6050  
6055  
6060  
6065  
6070  
6075  
6080  
6085  
6090  
6095  
6100  
6105  
6110  
6115  
6120  
6125  
6130  
6135  
6140  
6145  
6150  
6155  
6160  
6165  
6170  
6175  
6180  
6185  
6190  
6195  
6200  
6205  
6210  
6215  
6220  
6225  
6230  
6235  
6240  
6245  
6250  
6255  
6260  
6265  
6270  
6275  
6280  
6285  
6290  
6295  
6300  
6305  
6310  
6315  
6320  
6325  
6330  
6335  
6340  
6345  
6350  
6355  
6360  
6365  
6370  
6375  
6380  
6385  
6390  
6395  
6400  
6405  
6410  
6415  
6420  
6425  
6430  
6435  
6440  
6445  
6450  
6455  
6460  
6465  
6470  
6475  
6480  
6485  
6490  
6495  
6500  
6505  
6510  
6515  
6520  
6525  
6530  
6535  
6540  
6545  
6550  
6555  
6560  
6565  
6570  
6575  
6580  
6585  
6590  
6595  
6600  
6605  
6610  
6615  
6620  
6625  
6630  
6635  
6640  
6645  
6650  
6655  
6660  
6665  
6670  
6675  
6680  
6685  
6690  
6695  
6700  
6705  
6710  
6715  
6720  
6725  
6730  
6735  
6740  
6745  
6750  
6755  
6760  
6765  
6770  
6775  
6780  
6785  
6790  
6795  
6800  
6805  
6810  
6815  
6820  
6825  
6830  
6835  
6840  
6845  
6850  
6855  
6860  
6865  
6870  
6875  
6880  
6885  
6890  
6895  
6900  
6905  
6910  
6915  
6920  
6925  
6930  
6935  
6940  
6945  
6950  
6955  
6960  
6965  
6970  
6975  
6980  
6985  
6990  
6995  
7000  
7005  
7010  
7015  
7020  
7025  
7030  
7035  
7040  
7045  
7050  
7055  
7060  
7065  
7070  
7075  
7080  
7085  
7090  
7095  
7100  
7105  
7110  
7115  
7120  
7125  
7130  
7135  
7140  
7145  
7150  
7155  
7160  
7165  
7170  
7175  
7180  
7185  
7190  
7195  
7200  
7205  
7210  
7215  
7220  
7225  
7230  
7235  
7240  
7245  
7250  
7255  
7260  
7265  
7270  
7275  
7280  
7285  
7290  
7295  
7300  
7305  
7310  
7315  
7320  
7325  
7330  
7335  
7340  
7345  
7350  
7355  
7360  
7365  
7370  
7375  
7380  
7385  
7390  
7395  
7400  
7405  
7410  
7415  
7420  
7425  
7430  
7435  
7440  
7445  
7450  
7455  
7460  
7465  
7470  
7475  
7480  
7485  
7490  
7495  
7500  
7505  
7510  
7515  
7520  
7525  
7530  
7535  
7540  
7545  
7550  
7555  
7560  
7565  
7570  
7575  
7580  
7585  
7590  
7595  
7600  
7605  
7610  
7615  
7620  
7625  
7630  
7635  
7640  
7645  
7650  
7655  
7660  
7665  
7670  
7675  
7680  
7685  
7690  
7695  
7700  
7705  
7710  
7715  
7720  
7725  
7730  
7735  
7740  
7745  
7750  
7755  
7760  
7765  
7770  
7775  
7780  
7785  
7790  
7795  
7800  
7805  
7810  
7815  
7820  
7825  
7830  
7835  
7840  
7845  
7850  
7855  
7860  
7865  
7870  
7875  
7880  
7885  
7890  
7895  
7900  
7905  
7910  
7915  
7920  
7925  
7930  
7935  
7940  
7945  
7950  
7955  
7960  
7965  
7970  
7975  
7980  
7985  
7990  
7995  
8000  
8005  
8010  
8015  
8020  
8025  
8030  
8035  
8040  
8045  
8050  
8055  
8060  
8065  
8070  
8075  
8080  
8085  
8090  
8095  
8100  
8105  
8110  
8115  
8120  
8125  
8130  
8135  
8140  
8145  
8150  
8155  
8160  
8165  
8170  
8175  
8180  
8185  
8190  
8195  
8200  
8205  
8210  
8215  
8220  
8225  
8230  
8235  
8240  
8245  
8250  
8255  
8260  
8265  
8270  
8275  
8280  
8285  
8290  
8295  
8300  
8305  
8310  
8315  
8320  
8325  
8330  
8335  
8340  
8345  
8350  
8355  
8360  
8365  
8370  
8375  
8380  
8385  
8390  
8395  
8400  
8405  
8410  
8415  
8420  
8425  
8430  
8435  
8440  
8445  
8450  
8455  
8460  
8465  
8470  
8475  
8480  
8485  
8490  
8495  
8500  
8505  
8510  
8515  
8520  
8525  
8530  
8535  
8540  
8545  
8550  
8555  
8560  
8565  
8570  
8575  
8580  
8585  
8590  
8595  
8600  
8605  
8610  
8615  
8620  
8625  
8630  
8635  
8640  
8645  
8650  
8655  
8660  
8665  
8670  
8675  
8680  
8685  
8690  
8695  
8700  
8705  
8710  
8715  
8720  
8725  
8730  
8735  
8740  
8745  
8750  
8755  
8760  
8765  
8770  
8775  
8780  
8785  
8790  
8795  
8800  
8805  
8810  
8815  
8820  
8825  
8830  
8835  
8840  
8845  
8850  
8855  
8860  
8865  
8870  
8875  
8880  
8885  
8890  
8895  
8900  
8905  
8910  
8915  
8920  
8925  
8930  
8935  
8940  
8945  
8950  
8955  
8960  
8965  
8970  
8975  
8980  
8985  
8990  
8995  
9000  
9005  
9010  
9015  
9020  
9025  
9030  
9035  
9040  
9045  
9050  
9055  
9060  
9065  
9070  
9075  
9080  
9085  
9090  
9095  
9100  
9105  
9110  
9115  
9120  
9125  
9130  
9135  
9140  
9145  
9150  
9155  
9160  
9165  
9170  
9175  
9180  
9185  
9190  
9195  
9200  
9205  
9210  
9215  
9220  
9225  
9230  
9235  
9240  
9245  
9250  
9255  
9260  
9265  
9270  
9275  
9280  
9285  
9290  
9295  
9300  
9305  
9310  
9315  
9320  
9325  
9330  
9335  
9340  
9345  
9350  
9355  
9360  
9365  
9370  
9375  
9380  
9385  
9390  
9395  
9400  
9405  
9410  
9415  
9420  
9425  
9430  
9435  
9440  
9445<br

5 In the past, secured embedded microcontrollers have usually used standard microprocessor architectures and have attached security enhancing hardware around this core. In the inventive configuration, the architecture is designed with physical security in mind so that security hardware features are deeply embedded in the architecture, instead of around the periphery of the architecture.

10 One example of this plan is the way memory is used. Each memory type used on the invention (RAM, E<sup>2</sup>PROM, PROM, ROM, anti-fuse, fuse, laser-link) appears in several block sizes in the physical layout. There is 1 bit memory which is used in logic in a static way. There should be hundreds of single bit memory blocks. There can be a 16 bit block of memory that is used to control reconfigurable logic. There can be larger n bit arrays, as is normally seen on ICs. This tactic increases the complexity of the work that an adversary may attempt.

15 The execution of encrypted software is accomplished by modifying instruction sets in a CPU, thereby obviating the necessity for decrypting encrypted software external of the CPU. As a result, there is no decrypted output of the software external of the CPU. By sufficiently protecting the CPU from analysis during its operation, an attacker is denied access to a decrypted form of the software and is further denied access to information with which to decrypt the software.

20 A physical design for the CPU 11 can be done with multiple layers of metal and with diffused conductors, so that e-beam analysis is more difficult. Conductors used in executing the encrypted code would be formed in this manner. As is well known to people who practice the art of IC voltage-contrast imaging, it is usually necessary to have a stockpile of many ICs to etch back, cut apart, and to probe so that ICs that are destroyed can be thrown away and be replaced by an identical IC. If each IC has 25 uniquely programmed instruction sets, uniquely programmed address decoders, and uniquely programmed obfuscator circuits, then the pirate only gets one chance with one IC. If the pirate destroys one IC, she cannot get an identical IC to continue her work. She would have to start over again. Multiple layers of metal can be used to cover up lower levels of metal. In addition, p or n type silicon diffused conductors can be used to 30 hide signals below higher levels of interconnect.

It is further possible to implement the invention with a coprocessor in a system with an ordinary CPU. The output of the inventive CPU is then provided to the user's computer. In one variation of the invention, the inventive CPU would be provided with

multiple keys, including a fixed key, and keys which are changed at different periodic rates, such as yearly, monthly and at lesser time periods. While providing individual keys for individual CPUs, the ability of an adversary attempting to decrypt the software is limited to the ability to use that particular program on the particular CPU, without an ability to use the encrypted program on a different CPU.

It should be understood that various modifications within the scope of the invention can be made by one of ordinary skill in the art without departing from the spirit thereof, therefore it is intended that the invention be defined by the scope of the appended claims as broadly as the prior art will permit, and in view of the specification if need be.

卷之三

## WHAT IS CLAIMED IS:

1. A particularly configurable processor for processing error induced computer  
2 programs which are selectively operable on said particularly configurable processor,  
3 comprising:  
4 a programmable error correcting circuit;  
5 an instruction buffer for receiving instructions for microprocessor execution  
6 memory location for storing an error correction key; and  
7 the error correcting circuit controlled at least in part by said error correction key.

1. 2. The processor of claim 1, wherein the control of the error correction circuit  
2 permits correction in a predictable manner of intentionally inserted errors in a program  
3 provided for execution in accordance with an error correction scheme selected.

1. 2. 3. The processor of claim 1, wherein said key enables selection of error correction  
4 specific to the induced error scheme.

1. 2. 3. 4. The processor of claim 1, wherein information provided in compiled computer  
5 program data in part controls said error correction, thereby providing complementary  
6 error correction with a combination of the error correction key and the information  
7 provided in the compiled computer program data.

1. 2. 3. 5. The processor of claim 4, wherein the key includes bits expandable into a larger  
4 set of bits which control the instruction op code decoder, signal routing, and logic circuit  
5 reconfiguration.

1. 2. 6. The processor of claim 1, wherein a serial number in ROM participates in the  
3 control of the programmable error correcting circuit.

1. 2. 7. The processor of claim 1, wherein an output register for data results is provided,  
3 the output register able to contain both correct results and plausible wrong results.

1. 2. 8. The processor of claim 1, wherein:  
3 program instructions are provided in a pipeline architecture;

1           an information key is established as instruction security commands at a plurality of  
2    steps in said pipeline architecture; and

3           an arithmetic logic unit (ALU) provides variability of logic circuits for execution  
4    of encrypted op codes or standard op codes that provide standard instruction op code  
5    operation types.

1    9.    The processor of claim 8, further comprising:

2           a plurality of reconfigurable logic circuits able to calculate results of execution of  
3    an instruction;

4           a plurality of logic circuits including provisions for accepting correct data  
5    operands and plausible wrong data operands; and

6           said plurality of the logic circuits including provisions for outputting correct  
7    results along with plausible wrong results.

1    10.   The processor of claim 8, further comprising:

2           the key providing a capability of re-allocating memory resources and register  
3    resources;

4           a serial number in ROM which participates in the allocation of logic circuits and  
5    routing of signals; and

6           the serial number used in combination with the key in providing said capability.

1    11.   The processor of claim 1, wherein:

2           instruction key information is shared with a compiler, the instruction key  
3    information used by the compiler to encrypt standard instruction op codes into encrypted  
4    instruction op codes; and

5           the key is stored in more than one memory cell type including a Read Only  
6    Memory (ROM), an Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (E<sup>2</sup>PROM),  
7    and a Random Access Memory (RAM).

1    12.   The processor of claim 1, wherein:

2           an output register for data results provides a capability of providing data  
3    containing both correct results and plausible wrong results; and

1           the correct results are provided in word locations in the output register coordinated  
2        by the key.

1       13. The processor of claim 1, wherein data and instructions provided to a computer  
2        via program information include an intentional introduction of errors which are  
3        correctable with error correction algorithms, said correction algorithms pre-selected  
4        according to the key.

1       14. The processor of claim 1, wherein:  
2           dependency validation codes received through the multiplexer of the instruction  
3        buffer are checked by logic circuits that depend on the key, so that incorrect validation  
4        bits provide an alarm.

1       15. The processor of claim 14, wherein:  
2           upon receipt of said alarm, the interdependency checking logic writes an audit  
3        code and is capable of terminating program execution.

1       16. The processor of claim 1, further comprising:  
2           logic for requiring network handshaking, the network handshaking further used to  
3        provide additional key information for continued operation.

1       17. A microprocessor for processing computer programs which are selectively  
2        operable on selected ones of individual microprocessors, comprising:  
3           an error correcting circuit;  
4           a programmable feature on the error correcting circuit, providing a selectability in  
5        an error correction scheme to be performed by the error correcting circuit; and  
6           a memory location for storing error correction information, whereby the stored  
7        error correction information controls the programmable feature, thereby permitting  
8        correction of intentionally inserted errors in a program provided for execution in  
9        accordance with an error correction scheme selected.

1 18. Method for processing computer programs selectively operable on one or more  
2 selected individual microprocessors, comprising:  
3 providing an error correcting circuit;  
4 storing error correction control information in the form of an error correction key,  
5 thereby selecting an error correction scheme for execution in accordance with the key;  
6 and  
7 compiling program instructions in accordance with the selected error correction  
8 scheme, thereby permitting correction in a predictable manner of intentionally inserted  
9 errors in a program provided for execution in accordance with the error correction  
10 scheme selected.

1 19. The method of claim 18, further comprising:  
2 controlling said error correction controlled in part by information provided in  
3 compiled computer program data, thereby providing predictable error correction with a  
4 combination of the error correction key and the information provided in the compiled  
5 computer program data.

1 20. The method of claim 18, further comprising:  
2 using reconfigurable logic circuits for calculating the results of execution of an  
3 instruction op code;  
4 the calculation of results of the execution of an instruction op code including  
5 accepting correct data operands and plausible wrong data operands; and  
6 outputting correct results along with plausible wrong results.

1 21. The method of claim 18, further comprising:  
2 providing program instructions in a pipeline architecture; and  
3 establishing information keys as instruction security commands at a plurality of  
4 steps in said pipeline architecture, wherein an arithmetic logic unit (ALU) provides  
5 variability of logic circuits for execution of encrypted op codes or standard op codes that  
6 provide standard instruction operation types.

1       22. The method of claim 18, further comprising:  
2           providing a key shared with a compiler;  
3           encrypting standard instructions with the compiler using the key; and  
4           storing both correct results and plausible wrong results in an output register in  
5       word locations in the output register coordinated by the key.

1       23. The method of claim 18, further comprising:  
2           providing a key shared with a compiler;  
3           encrypting standard instruction op codes with the compiler using the key;  
4           providing data and instruction op codes to the computer via program information  
5       including an intentional introduction of errors which are correctable with error correction  
6       algorithms, said correction algorithms pre-selected according to the key and long  
7       instruction words; and  
8           changing the correction algorithms on a periodic basis by codes hidden in the  
9       instruction op codes gathered into an instruction buffer.

1       24. The method of claim 18, further comprising:  
2           using logic for requiring network handshaking; and  
3           further using the network handshaking to provide additional key information for  
4       continued operation.

1       25. Method for compiling computer programs selectively operable on selected ones of  
2       individual microprocessors in which the individual microprocessors include programmable  
3       error correction circuitry, the method comprising:  
4           selecting an error correction scheme for execution;  
5           providing error correction control information in the form of an error correction  
6       key; and  
7           compiling program instruction op codes in accordance with the selected error  
8       correction scheme, thereby permitting correction in a predictable manner of intentionally  
9       inserted errors in a program provided for execution in accordance with the error  
10      correction scheme selected.

1       26. Method for limiting operability of a computer program to selected ones of  
2       individual microprocessors, comprising:  
3               providing error correction control information for use in executing the program;  
4               and  
5               compiling program instruction op codes with intentionally inserted errors  
6       correctable by use of said error correction control information.

SECURE PROGRAM EXECUTION DEPENDING ON  
PREDICTABLE ERROR CORRECTION

ABSTRACT OF THE DISCLOSURE

A CPU is provided with an ability to modify its operation, with respect to error correction, as a programmable feature. An error correction scheme is selected to be performed by the error correcting circuit. The compiled program may have intentionally introduced errors which are predictably corrected by the selected error correction scheme.

5 When a program is compiled, the program is modified by the intentional insertion of errors which would result from the execution of the program. By providing error correction schema selected during program compilation, errors can be inserted in the program code, but are handled in a predictable manner by the error correction.

DRAFTING, PUBLISHING, AND MAILED




Fig. 1

51




Fig. 2





Fig. 3



*Fig. 4*




Fig. 5




Fig. 6






Fig. 7



*Fig. 8*



*Fig. 9*

5437-076

+

9/10

11

IC

FLAG = 0

FLAG = 1

FLAG = 0


FLAG = 1

FLAG = 0

FLAGS = 010011

*Fig. 10*

+



*Fig. 11*

**PATENT APPLICATION**

**DECLARATION AND POWER OF ATTORNEY**  
**Original Application**

As below named inventor, I declare that I have reviewed and understand the contents of the specification, including the claims, as amended by any amendment specifically referred to in this Declaration, that the information given herein is true, that I believe that I am the original and first inventor of the invention entitled:

**SECURE PROGRAM EXECUTION DEPENDING ON PREDICTABLE ERROR CORRECTION**

which is described and claimed in:

the attached specification or  
 the specification in application Serial No. \_\_\_\_\_ filed \_\_\_\_\_.  
 The present application is a continuation-in-part of Prior Application Serial No. \_\_\_\_\_ filed \_\_\_\_\_, and may be considered to disclose and claim subject matter in addition to that disclosed in the Prior Application, and I hereby claim the benefit of 35 U.S.C. Section 120.

that I acknowledge my duty to disclose information in accordance with 37 C.F.R. Section 1.56 and defined on the attached sheet, which is material to the examination of this application, that I do not know and do not believe the same was ever known or used in the United States of America before my or our invention thereof or patented or described in any printed publication in any country before my or our invention thereof, or more than one year prior to this application, or in public use or on sale in the United States of America more than one year prior to this application, that the invention has not been patented or made the subject of an inventor's certificate issued before the date of this application in any country foreign to the United States of America on an application filed by me or my legal representatives or assigns more than twelve months prior to this application and that as to applications for patent or inventor's certificate filed by me or my legal representatives or assigns in any country foreign to the United States of America, the earliest filed foreign application(s) filed within twelve months prior to the filing date of this application and all foreign applications filed more than twelve months prior to the filing date of this application, if any, are identified below.

**CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX**

No earlier-filed foreign applications.  
 Required information as to foreign applications filed prior to filing date of this application is on page 5 attached hereto and made a part hereof.

**POWER OF ATTORNEY:**

As a named inventor, I hereby appoint the following attorney(s) and/or agent(s) to prosecute this application and transact all business in the Patent and Trademark Office connected therewith.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>REGISTRATION NO.</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>REGISTRATION NO.</u>
Kenneth Olsen	26,493	Robert P. Sabath	29,107
Timothy J. Crean	37,116	Bobby K. Truong	37,499
Phillip J. McKay	38,966	John F. Schipper	26,994
Robert S. Hauser	37,847	Stanley N. Protigal	28,657
Joseph T. FitzGerald	33,881	of SABATH & TRUONG	
Alexander E. Silverman	37,940		
Christine S. Lam	37,489		
of SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC.			

**SEND CORRESPONDENCE TO**

**SABATH & TRUONG**  
 111 N. Market Street, Suite 815  
 San Jose, California 95113

**DIRECT TELEPHONE CALLS TO**

408/293-9934  
 Fax: 408/293-2183

(201) FULL NAME OF INVENTOR	LAST NAME <b>FOLMSBEE</b>	FIRST NAME <b>ALAN</b>	MIDDLE NAME	
RESIDENCE & CITIZENSHIP	CITY <b>Mt. Hamilton</b>	STATE OR FOREIGN COUNTRY <b>California</b>	COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP <b>USA</b>	
POST OFFICE ADDRESS	POST OFFICE ADDRESS <b>3060 Three Springs Court</b>	CITY <b>Mt. Hamilton</b>	STATE OR COUNTRY <b>USA</b>	ZIP CODE <b>95140</b>

I further declare that all statements made herein of my own knowledge are true and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true; and further that these statements were made with the knowledge that willful false statements and the like so made are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, under section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and that such willful false statements may jeopardize the validity of the application or any patent issuing thereon.

Name (201)  Alan C. Folmsbee	Signature 	Date  July 27, 1999
------------------------------------	--	---------------------------

## Section 1.56 Duty to Disclose Information Material to Patentability.

(a) A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. The public interest is best served, and the most effective patent examination occurs when, at the time an application is being examined, the Office is aware of and evaluates the teachings of all information material to patentability. Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this section. The duty to disclose information exists with respect to each pending claim until the claim is cancelled or withdrawn from consideration, or the application becomes abandoned. Information material to the patentability of a claim that is cancelled or withdrawn from consideration need not be submitted if the information is not material to the patentability of any claim remaining under consideration in the application. There is no duty to submit information which is not material to the patentability of any existing claim. The duty to disclose all information known to be material to patentability is deemed to be satisfied if all information known to be material to patentability of any claim issued in a patent was cited by the Office or submitted to the Office in the manner prescribed by Sections 1.97(b)-(d) and 1.98. However, no patent will be granted on an application in connection with which fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional misconduct. The Office encourages applications to carefully examine:

(1) prior art cited in search reports of a foreign patent office in a counterpart application, and

(2) the closest information over which individuals associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent application believe any pending claim patentably defines, to make sure that any material information contained therein is disclosed to the Office.

(b) Under this section, information is material to patentability when it is not cumulative to information already of record or being made of record in the application, and

(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or

(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the application takes in:

(i) opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or

(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.

A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when the information compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each term in the claim its broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification, and before any considerations given to evidence which may be submitted in an attempt to establish a contrary conclusion of patentability.

(c) Individuals associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent application within the meaning of this section are:

(1) Each inventor named in the application;

(2) Each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application; and

(3) Every other person who is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application and who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application.

(d) Individuals other than the attorney, agent or inventor may comply with this section by disclosing information to the attorney, agent or inventor.